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Non-technical summary 
In the 1980s, the European Union (EU) started to develop its own technology policy 
independent from the member states. Since then the Framework Programme for 
Research and Technological Development (FP) has become the major funding scheme 
in this policy field. With a budget of around 17 billion Euros, the Sixth Framework 
Programme (FP6) provided funding for R&D projects in the years 2002 to 2006. 
Several attempts have been made recently to assess the impact of FP6 projects. A key 
interest of these reviews has been to analyse the structure of participation, i.e. who 
chose to participate and what these participants did achieve. One result is that FP6 
projects involved the contribution of excellent scientists, measured in terms of 
publications and received citations. Another result is that participation seems to be 
widely regarded as a “quality seal” for the researchers involved.  
This paper focuses on public science and the role that FP6 played for financing 
research in relation to other grant sources available to the scientists. In fact, university 
scientists may typically consider four types of extramural funding schemes. Besides 
the FP, national governments, foundations, and – not least – industry grants can be 
significant sources. Although all funding bodies typically apply competitive, merit-
based selection procedures, there may be different priorities and success criteria to 
award a grant. Hence, scientists can be assumed to select the funding source for which 
they expect the highest “return”. More specifically, this paper investigates whether 
FP6 actually succeeded in attracting the scientific “A Team” given the variety of 
funding opportunities available to public science, and whether an FP6 participation 
complements or substitutes other types of grants. Based on a random sample of 
German scientists at universities and public research institutes, the paper links the 
scientist’s excellence and productivity in terms of publication and patenting activities 
to the choice of a particular grant.  
The results indicate that highly credentialed scientists in fact prefer government, 
foundation and industry grants over FP6. Moreover, FP6 participation seems to 
substitute for other types of grants. These findings suggest that the FP is in fact the 
funding instrument for the scientific “B Team” which is in stark contrast to prior 
reviews of the FP. There seems to be a “division of labour” between the FP, which 
focuses on rather application-oriented research by mediocre scientists, and the other 
grant programmes, which clearly focus on scientific excellence. If this is intended to 
be changed other funding priorities will be required, for example smaller team sizes, 
no pre-definition of research topics by the European Commission, and a higher quality 
of the peer review system. However, application-oriented research needs funding too, 
and the FP seems to be the instrument through which such objectives can be 
accomplished. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Mit einem Budget von rund 17 Mrd. Euro bildete das sechste Forschungsrahmen-
programm (FP6) der Europäischen Kommission die Grundlage für die Förderung von 
FuE-Projekten in den Jahren 2002 bis 2006. In letzter Zeit wurden mehrere Studien 
vorgelegt, die sich mit der Wirkung des FP6 befassen. Im Mittelpunkt vieler Studien 
stand dabei die Analyse der Teilnahmestrukturen, d.h. wer die Teilnehmer waren und 
was sie erreichten. So wurde festgestellt, dass herausragende Wissenschaftler, 
gemessen an Publikationen und Zitationen, am FP6 teilnahmen. Ein anderes Ergebnis 
war, dass die Teilnahme am FP6 von vielen als „Qualitätssiegel“ betrachtet wird. 
Dieser Beitrag beschränkt sich auf Wissenschaftler an Universitäten und anderen 
öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen und deren Wahl für ein bestimmtes 
Förderprogramm. Neben dem FP auf europäischer Ebene stellen Fördermittel von 
Bundes- und Länderregierungen, Stiftungen und nicht zuletzt von der Industrie 
wichtige Quellen dar. Obwohl alle Förderer normalerweise wettbewerbs- und 
leistungsbasierte Auswahlkriterien anwenden, unterscheiden sie sich oft im Hinblick 
auf Prioritäten und Erfolgskriterien für die Gewährung von Zuschüssen. Man kann 
somit annehmen, dass sich Wissenschaftler die Forschungsförderung aussuchen, von 
der sie sich den höchsten „Ertrag“ erwarten. Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist daher die 
vergleichende Untersuchung der Entscheidungen von Wissenschaftlern für externe 
Forschungsförderung. Im Besonderen wird betrachtet, ob es dem FP6 in Anbetracht 
der Vielfalt an Fördermöglichkeiten, die der öffentlichen Forschung zur Verfügung 
stehen, gelungen ist, das wissenschaftliche „A-Team“ anzusprechen und ob die 
Teilnahme an FP6 andere Fördertypen ergänzt oder ausschließt.  
Auf Grundlage einer Stichprobe von deutschen Wissenschaftlern an Universitäten 
und anderen öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen untersucht diese Arbeit die Rolle 
von Exzellenz und Produktivität von Wissenschaftlern, gemessen an 
Veröffentlichungen und Patenten, bei der Entscheidung für ein bestimmtes 
Förderprogramm. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass hochproduktive Wissenschaftler 
Regierungs-, Stiftungs- und Industrieförderung dem FP6 vorziehen. In dieser Hinsicht 
scheint eine sinnvolle Arbeitsteilung zwischen dem FP, das eher auf anwendungs- 
bzw. beratungsorientierte Forschung von mittelmäßigen Wissenschaftlern fokussiert, 
und anderen Förderprogrammen, deren Ziel die wissenschaftliche Exzellenz ist, zu 
bestehen. Soll allerdings das FP kompatibler zu bestehenden Förderalternativen 
werden, so sind deutliche Veränderungen notwendig. Hierzu zählen beispielsweise 
kleinere Projektgrößen, eine thematisch offene Ausschreibung, geringerer Antrags- 
und Verwaltungsaufwand und einer Verbesserung des Begutachtungssystems.  
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Abstract 
Several reviews and impact assessment studies have concluded that the Sixth Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP6) succeeded in fostering 
scientific excellence and attracting the “A Team” in public science. However, these studies 
typically fail to contrast their findings with the variety of funding opportunities available to 
public science. Based on a sample of more than 1,000 scientists at universities and public 
research institutes in Germany, this paper finds that highly credentialed faculty typically 
chose other funding opportunities than FP6, for example grants from science foundations or 
industry. In fact, FP6 only seems to be attractive for the scientific “B Team” that works rather 
application oriented. The findings further indicate that an FP6 participation substitutes for 
other grant programmes while the latter are complementary to each other. If this is intended to 
be changed other funding priorities will be required, for example smaller team sizes, less pre-
defined research topics, a reduced administrative burden, and a higher quality of the peer 
review system. 
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1 Introduction 
In the 1980s, the European Union (EU) started to develop its own science, technology and 
innovation (STI) policy independent from the member states. Since then the Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP) has become the major funding 
scheme in this policy field (Marin and Siotis, 2008). With a budget of almost 17 billion Euros, 
the Sixth Framework Programme (FP6) provided funding for R&D projects in the years 2002 
to 2006. Several attempts have been made recently to assess the impact of FP6 projects (e.g., 
Arnold et al., 2008; Technopolis, 2008; BMBF, 2009; Rietschel, 2009). A key interest of 
these reviews has been to analyse the structure of participation, i.e. who chose to participate 
and what these participants did achieve. One result is that FP6 projects involved the 
contribution of excellent scientists, measured in terms of publications and received citations 
(Technopolis, 2008). Another result is that participation seems to be widely regarded as a 
“quality seal” for the researchers involved (Rietschel, 2009). 
Although these results are undisputed, FP6 participation has typically been evaluated 
without considering alternative funding schemes available to scientists. While the FP and 
many other public funding schemes are open to industry and public science alike, this paper 
focuses on scientists at universities and other public research organisations (PRO) and their 
choice for a particular funding scheme. In fact, public scientists may typically consider four 
types of extramural funding schemes. Besides the FP, national government, foundation, and – 
not least – industry grants can be significant sources. Scientists, like all economic agents, can 
be assumed to select those grants for which they anticipate the highest “return”. In this 
respect, return refers to the balance between the effort to walk through the application 
process, to manage the projects and cope with the administrative burden (in case that funding 
is received), and the amount of the funding itself, weighted by the probability of receiving the 
grant. As all funding bodies claim to apply competitive, merit-based selection procedures, the 
probability of receiving the grant is dependent on the scientist’s excellence and research 
productivity.  
The objective of this paper is therefore to provide a comparative analysis of scientists’ 
choices for extramural research grants. More specifically, this paper investigates whether FP6 
actually succeeded in attracting the scientific “A Team” (Rietschel, 2009) given the variety of 
funding opportunities available to public science, and whether an FP6 participation 
complements or substitutes other types of grants. Moreover, this paper not only sheds light on 
the choice but also on the actual scale to which the four types of grants contribute to the 
scientist’s total research budget. The setting for this study is Germany which is particularly 
suitable since it took the lion’s share of funding in FP6 and at the same time features a highly 
developed research funding infrastructure (BMBF, 2009). Based on a sample of German 
scientists at universities and public research institutes, the paper links the scientist’s 
excellence and productivity in terms of publication and patenting activities to the choice for a 
particular grant, while controlling for individual and institutional characteristics.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
policy context and rationale for research funding and sheds light on the different types of 
grants and their characteristics. Section 3 elucidates the role of scientific excellence played for 
the choice of a particular type of grant. Section 4 focuses on data and methods chosen while 
the results are presented in section 5. The paper concludes in section 6 with a discussion of 
the results as well as implications for STI policy and further research opportunities. 
2 Policy context and rationale  
The funding of public science can typically be characterised as a mix of institutional (“lump 
sum”) and project-based funding (Schmoch and Schubert, 2009). While the institutional 
funding is determined by the state authorities, there are various sources for project-based 
funding, which can be public or private and on different levels (regional, national, and 
international). In fact, most European countries exhibit a well-developed funding 
infrastructure available to public science. In addition to that, the European Union started to 
develop its own STI policy in the 1980s, leading to the availability of funding schemes at the 
supra-national level, most importantly through the Framework Programme. In the following, a 
rather broad distinction is drawn between four different types of funding schemes that public 
scientists typically consider as relevant: grants within the FP, grants from national 
governments, grants from science foundations, and grants from industry.  
Endowed with a substantial budget, the FPs provide funding typically for technology-
oriented research joint ventures that comprise partners from various countries (Marin and 
Siotis, 2008). FP funding is awarded subject to several conditions that the prospective 
consortia have to meet. First, the projects need to be pre-competitive such that a conflict with 
EU competition law is prevented. At the same time, however, they are expected to strengthen 
the competitiveness of EU firms, either through having them participate directly in projects or 
through deliberate knowledge and technology transfer (KTT) and broad dissemination of the 
project outcomes. They should also demonstrate their usefulness for policy making. Second, 
in order to increase the chance of funding, consortia need to exhibit a fair representation of 
partners from “peripheral” countries, including for example the new member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe (Marin and Siotis, 2008). A major drawback of participation in 
the FPs from the scientists’ perspective has been the substantial administrative burden 
associated with the application for and management of projects which has frequently been 
described as very costly and time consuming (Luukkonen, 2002). Moreover, scientists have 
criticised the requirement to form unsuitably large consortia, particularly for the social 
sciences and humanities, as well as a rather narrow definition of research topics (BMBF, 
2009). 
As its predecessors, FP6, which ran from 2002 to 2006, did not cover all areas of science 
and technology but instead focused on a limited number of thematic priorities in which 
projects were carried out. Nevertheless, the FP’s scope has become broader over time, 
meanwhile covering a wide range of themes and funding instruments that include also the 
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mobility of researchers (European Commission, 2002). Similarly, the economic and political 
justification for the FPs has become more elaborate. While the FPs up to FP4 declared added 
value through networking, cohesion and scale benefits to be a sufficient justification, FP5 
shifted the focus towards socio-economic benefits in general. The launch of FP6 corresponded 
to the implementation of the European Research Area (ERA) which aims at bundling 
resources for research to create a system of scientific excellence that could readily compete 
with those of the U.S. and Japan. In order to build scale, FP6 therefore featured larger funding 
instruments with the objective to bring together the scientific elite from various countries 
(Marin and Siotis, 2008). In fact, over the recent years, the FPs have become a widely used 
instrument as Table 1 shows. 
Table 1: Overview of FP5 and FP6 participation 
 FP6 FP6 excluding 
mobility actions 
FP5 FP5 excluding 
mobility actions 
Total no of contracts 10,058 5,485 16,553 12,391 
Total no of participants 74,400 65,960 84,267 75,046 
Average no of participants per contract 7.4 12.0 5.1 6.1 
Total EC financial contribution €m 16,669 14,952 13,065 11,808 
Average EC financial contribution €m 1.66 2.73 0.79 0.95 
Average EC contribution/participant €m 0.22 0.23 0.16 0.16 
Source: European Commission (2008). 
Excludes EURATOM fusion, which is contracted via contracts of association with national fusion associations. 
 
Besides the sizable amount available through the FP, university scientists may rely on 
several other sources in order to finance their research, including the government, science 
foundations or industry. Bozeman and Gaughan (2007) show for the U.S. that federal 
government grants constitute by far the most important funding source for academic research. 
This situation is similar to large European economies like Germany where the annual 
expenditures for public science (around 32 billion Euros per year during 2002 to 2005) are 
more than twice as high as the total budget available through FP6 over a period of five years 
(BMBF, 2008).2 The government typically also provides the majority of funds to science 
foundations, like the National Science Foundation in the U.S. or similar organisations in 
European countries to finance research. Furthermore, there are foundations which may be 
endowed by firms, like the Volkswagen Foundation, or other patrons. Both public and private 
foundations are usually rather important funding sources, not particularly in terms of the total 
budget available for grants but instead because of their high scientific reputation. The German 
Science Foundation, for example, annually awards the “Leibniz Prize” to ten distinguished 
scientists who receive “honour, prize money and idyllic freedom” (DFG, 2009), based on a 
highly competitive selection procedure. 
Compared with grants from the government and science foundations, industry grants have 
contributed a relatively small share of funding, especially in the social sciences and 
humanities (Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007). In fact, the lion’s share of industrial research is 
                                                 
2  The figure for Germany also includes the institutional financing of universities and public research centers 
which does not comprise grants-related research. 
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carried out in-house. The small contribution of industry is, however, in stark contrast to the 
alleged social and economical importance (e.g., Hall et al., 2003; Mansfield, 1995). 
Consequently, numerous efforts have been made in order to increase industry-science 
linkages, including R&D tax credits for industry funding of academic research (Bozeman and 
Gaughan, 2007) or research and technology partnerships (e.g., Audretsch et al., 2002; Link 
and Scott, 2005). Probably most important for establishing grants-related contacts between 
academia and industry has been the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S. in 1980 and 
its equivalents about 20 years later in European countries (Mowery et al., 2001). Facilitating 
the transfer of intellectual property rights, this regulation smoothed the way for universities to 
engage in grants-related research projects with industry. 
Behind these four different types of funding schemes is a bewildering variety of grants and 
programmes. There is, however, ample empirical evidence suggesting that STI policy should 
be concerned with the provision of adequate funding of public science. Research grants are 
found to increase individual productivity (Stephan, 1996; Lee and Bozeman, 2005) although 
this relationship is moderated by the scientist’s career stage (Arora and Gambardella, 2006) 
and the size of the grant (Godin, 2003). Moreover, most research grants are intended to 
stimulate collaborative behaviour among scientists (Defazio et al., 2009). Collaboration has in 
fact been a cornerstone of all FPs and particularly in FP6 which featured also a new funding 
instrument specifically for that purpose (“networks of excellence”). While funding oriented 
towards teams of scientists has been shown to increase collaborative behaviour (Arora et al., 
1998; Adams, 2005), the effect of collaboration on research productivity is less clear. Arora et 
al. (1998) find that, despite a negative effect of funding on team productivity, scientists would 
not have collaborated without funding. Lee and Bozeman (2005) show that funding is 
positively linked with collaboration and productivity even though they do not investigate the 
effect of funded collaboration on productivity. Evaluating these inconclusive results, Defazio 
et al. (2009) argue that funding cannot necessarily be regarded as productivity enhancing 
although it may allow scientists to move on along existing collaboration otherwise being more 
difficult to realise. Based on a panel of 294 scientists in collaborative projects financed 
through the FP, they distinguish between pre-, during- and post-funding periods and show that 
collaborations specifically formed to benefit from funding opportunities do not stimulate 
productivity in the short run but serve as effective instruments to enhance productivity in the 
longer run. 
In sum, university scientists are confronted with a large variety of funding opportunities. 
While all funding schemes and grants employ different award criteria, a common feature is 
their focus on the excellence and productivity of the applying scientist. The following section 
will therefore explore the role of scientific excellence for attaining a research grant. 
3 The role of scientific excellence 
A common notion in the evaluation of FP6 and the participation of scientists is that FP6 
included projects in which excellent scientists collaborated. Competitive and merit-based 
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selection procedures have been described as a cornerstone of FP6, and the research conducted 
in the thematic areas has been evaluated as being of international standard (Rietschel, 2009). 
Principal investigators in FP6-funded projects have been found to excel their peers in terms of 
publications and citation performance (Technopolis, 2008). Moreover, participation in the FP 
is regarded as a “seal of quality” in many countries and an indicator for the scientific quality 
of the projects and the scientists involved (Rietschel, 2009). Some institutions like the 
University of Copenhagen even offer additional research money conditional upon being 
granted an FP project. 
The strong emphasis on quality is motivated by the premise that public funds should not be 
wasted on less promising projects and their applicants. In this context it has been frequently 
recognised that academic research can be characterised by a “winner-takes-it-all” reward 
system in which the first to contribute a discovery in a peer-reviewed domain receives indirect 
and direct rewards, including citations, prizes, research grants or endowed chairs (Dasgupta 
and David, 1994; Sorensen and Fleming, 2004; Mudambi and Swift, 2009). At the same time, 
competition for research funding has increased considerably over the past decades as most 
scientists are to an increasing extent dependent on the acquisition of external grants in order to 
conduct research (Viner et al., 2004). In order to demonstrate legitimacy of the funding 
allocation, a key tenet of virtually all funding processes is that outcomes should be 
meritocratic. Although Viner et al. (2004) find that decisions by funding agencies cannot be 
fully explained by a scientist’s reputation for excellence, scientists typically succeed in a 
competitive funding allocation process because of their past performance. In this respect, past 
performance may have an effect on current performance because of a “cumulative 
advantage”. Such an advantage basically reflects both past recognition and the stock of past 
knowledge accumulated by the scientist (Defazio et al., 2009). In other words, past 
performance is associated with the level of reputation necessary to attract research funding 
and to clear the hurdle of peer-review.  
Basically the same mechanism applies to industry grants. Academic reputation serves as a 
signal to potential commercialisation partners in industry (Murray, 2004). Grimpe and Fier 
(2010) show that higher scientific productivity, along with other quality indicators such as 
tenure, increase the likelihood that academics will transfer technology or applied research 
results to industry, co-author a paper with industry personnel, or serve as a formal paid 
consultant to an industrial firm. Besides highly-ranked publications, industry is therefore 
presumably also interested in patents that scientists might have generated. Patents may serve 
as a mechanism to appropriate the returns from inventive activity and thus open up 
commercialisation opportunities for firms. In fact, recent studies for the U.S. and Germany 
show that publications and university patenting are positively linked (e.g., Agrawal and 
Henderson, 2002; Stephan et al., 2006; Czarnitzki et al., 2009). As a consequence, as long as 
funding agencies and industry base their grant decisions on past performance, highly 
credentialed scientists will presumably seek funding from those sources where the expected 
benefits clearly outweigh the costs of applying for and managing a project.  
The following section will hence explore the determinants of the choices for a particular 
grant, i.e. FP6, the national government, foundations, and industry. Particular attention is paid 
to the role of scientific excellence in order to evaluate whether FP6 actually is a premier 
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funding instrument for highly credentialed scientists. Moreover, it is of interest to elucidate 
whether scientists tend to choose a particular combination of different types of grants. In other 
words, the analysis will focus on the question whether a choice for an FP6 funded project 
coincided with the choice for another grant from a different source. 
4 Empirical approach 
4.1 Data 
The data used in the empirical analysis result from a survey among German scientists and 
was carried out within an evaluation project of FP6 on behalf of the German Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research. The survey was designed to yield an overview of university 
scientist’s efforts to acquire research funding from several different sources. Data collection 
took place in 2008 and was implemented using an online questionnaire. Contacting 
respondents via e-mail involves the risk of outdated or misspelled e-mail addresses. 
Nevertheless, online surveys serve as quick and efficient instruments in order to reach a large 
number of persons.  
The sampling procedure involved two major data sources. First, German university 
professors and academic personnel with a PhD are listed in the “Hochschullehrerverzeichnis” 
with their names, degrees and contact information.3 As a substantial share of public R&D in 
Germany is performed in public research organisations, scientists at the four large German 
PROs – Max Planck Society, Fraunhofer Society, Leibniz Association and Helmholtz 
Association – holding a PhD were identified via an internet search of the institutes’ websites. 
These two data sources yielded a population of 20,519 scientists with an available and not 
obviously wrong e-mail address. For 4,250 scientists, delivery of the message failed. We 
obtained 2,797 responses, a response rate on the net sample of 17.2 percent which can be 
regarded as satisfactory for such a large-scale online survey. Due to missing values for some 
variables the actual number of observations available for analysis is, however, lower. 
4.2 Measures 
The measures for the use of grants are based on faculty responses. Scientists were asked 
whether they were awarded4 one of the four different types of research grants: FP6, the 
German government (including both federal and state funding), foundations, and industry. If 
yes, they were asked to indicate the share that this particular grant contributed to their overall 
                                                 
3  This excludes the so-called “universities of applied sciences” whose major task is teaching and not research. 
4  This includes participation in a research consortium that jointly applied for a grant. 
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budget. The time frame the scientists should refer to was from 2002 to 2006 which 
corresponds to the duration of FP6.  
Our main explanatory variables reflect the scientist’s research productivity which is 
represented by the number of publications in refereed scientific journals and the number of 
patent applications they were involved with.5 The time frame the scientists should refer to was 
also from 2002 to 2006 which could raise concerns regarding potential endogeneity. 
Moreover, reversed causality could be an issue in that an early participation in a grant 
programme led to publications and patents in later years.6 An argument to combat these 
endogeneity concerns are the time lags in academic publishing and patenting. Before a paper 
is accepted for publication in a refereed journal or a patent application is drafted, significant 
research efforts have to be made which usually take place several years prior to publication or 
patenting. In this respect, we can assume that research output assigned to the years 2002 
through 2006 is in fact a result of research productivity in prior years.  
The analysis includes a number of explanatory variables to control for the individual 
characteristics and the institutional environment of the scientist. Dummy variables are 
included for the scientist’s gender, whether the scientist is tenured, leader of a research group 
and whether a grant was received within at least one of the previous FPs. Moreover, the 
scientist’s age as a linear and squared term, the institutional affiliation (dummy variables for 
Fraunhofer Society, Max Planck Society, Leibniz and Helmholtz Association, with university 
affiliation being the reference category) as well as the scientific field (dummy variables for 
life sciences; chemistry, physics, mathematics, and computer sciences; engineering sciences; 
with social sciences and humanities being the reference category) are included. These control 
variables have frequently been employed in studies focusing on the behaviour of university 
scientists and are also causally relevant to this research (e.g., Gaughan and Bozeman, 2002; 
Bozeman and Corley, 2004; Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007). The reasoning is that more 
productive scientists are more likely to be senior, tenured, leading a research group and, 
therefore, are more likely to receive a grant. Similarly, patterns of grant activity may vary 
according to the scientist’s gender, particularly when it comes to industry support (e.g., 
Corley and Gaughan, 2005). In addition, disciplinary field effects are widely acknowledged as 
important in a range of faculty activities (e.g., Edler et al., 2008). 
                                                 
5  The questionnaire did not specify a certain patent office but instead referred to the concept of a patent family 
representing a single invention that could have however led to patent applications at several patent offices. 
Although there may be differences in the technological and economic importance of patent applications, for 
example between the European Patent Office and national patent offices, this research is primarily interested 
in whether scientists consider the commercialisation of their research results and not in potential differences 
between the institutional loci of patent application. 
6  Assigning research results like publications or patents immediately to the participation in a grant programme 
is, however, challenging due to the cumulative nature and indivisibilities of knowledge. While grants might 
contribute a great deal towards the achievement of a research result, scientists will virtually always build 
upon prior knowledge and complementary knowledge from other sources. 
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4.3 Model 
The choice of the dependent variables is reflected by the estimation strategy which involves 
two steps. First, a multivariate probit model for the scientist’s choice of the four different 
types of grants is estimated: FP6, the German government, foundations, and industry. The 
multivariate probit model does not only explore the effects of the explanatory variables 
outlined above but also provides a test of the correlation of the error terms for the four types 
of grants conditional on the vector of covariates (Athey and Stern, 1998; Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006). A positive and significant correlation coefficient rho between two grants 
suggests that these two grants are complementary, i.e. scientists make use of both funding 
sources to secure their budget. If the coefficient is negative, both grants can be regarded as 
substitutive, i.e. scientists tend to focus on either one of the grants. Second, tobit models for 
the share of funding that stems from one of the four funding sources are estimated.  
In both the probit and the tobit model there is a potential selection effect in that a scientist 
who did not get funding through a particular funding scheme either could have not applied for 
the grant at all or could have been unsuccessful with her or his application. Thus, ideally a 
selection model is required to estimate the likelihood of filing an application for a particular 
grant and to yield an efficient estimate for the likelihood of being funded through a particular 
grant. In the following, the models are estimated without such a selection step for two 
reasons. First, this research is interested in the outcome – which is the likelihood of obtaining 
funding from a specific source – and not in the determinants of filing an application. Second, 
and more importantly, while FP6 was a single programme it featured a multitude of calls 
during the period from 2002 to 2006 for which scientists could apply, Moreover, there is a 
bewildering variety of different grants and funding instruments available from the three other 
sources of financing. An appropriate selection model would thus need to consider potential 
applications to all the different calls and grants available from the four sources. Nevertheless, 
in order to increase confidence into the results, a robustness check is performed using 
additional information available from the questionnaire. Scientists were asked to indicate on a 
Likert scale from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important) how important the acquisition 
of extramural research grants is for a continuation of their research activities. If scientists face 
a high pressure to acquire grants (indicated by a value of 4 or 5 on the Likert scale) it can be 
assumed that they actually had to file a grant application during the years 2002 to 2006. 
Consequently, for the robustness check the sample is restricted to those scientists indicating 
high pressure to acquire grants. Results will be described in the next section while the 
estimation tables can be found in the appendix. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent as well as our main explanatory 
and control variables. A correlation table for the explanatory variables can be found in the 
appendix. There is no indication for collinearity in the data as evidenced by an average 
variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.41 (Belsley et al., 1980). 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables      
Grant from FP6 (d) 1004 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Grant from national government (d) 1004 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Grant from foundations (d) 1004 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Grant from industry (d) 1004 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Budget share from FP6 755 0.24 0.30 0 1 
Budget share from nat. government 726 0.21 0.27 0 1 
Budget share from foundations 726 0.36 0.36 0 1 
Budget share from industry 726 0.11 0.21 0 1 
Explanatory variables      
No. of publications 1004 21.10 27.14 0 178 
No. of patent applications 1004 0.84 2.03 0 20 
Gender (d, 1 = female) 1004 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Age (years) 1004 49.10 8.40 28 74 
Tenured (d) 1004 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Research group leader (d) 1004 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Grant received from FP1-5 (d) 1004 0.40 0.49 0 1 
University (d) 1004 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Fraunhofer Society (d) 1004 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Max Planck Society (d) 1004 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Helmholtz / Leibniz Association (d) 1004 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Social sciences and humanities (d) 1004 0.20 0.49 0 1 
Life sciences (d) 1004 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Chemistry, physics, mathematics (d) 1004 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Engineering sciences (d) 1004 0.20 0.40 0 1 
(d): dummy variable      
 
Table 2 shows that the scientists in the sample have frequently received grants from the 
various sources. More than half of the scientists were involved in an FP6 sponsored research 
project, followed by grants from foundations, the government, and industry. On average, 
scientists received more than one third of their funds from foundations, followed by 24 
percent coming from FP6, 21 percent from the government and 11 percent from industry. This 
indicates that foundations are by far the most important source for financing.  
Regarding the explanatory variables, scientists have achieved on average 21 publications in 
the 5-year period from 2002 to 2006 and almost one patent application. They have an average 
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age of 49 years, and most of them are tenured and lead a research group. Only 16 percent of 
the scientists in the sample are female. 40 percent of the scientists reported experiences with 
one of the previous FPs. Most of them are university scientists7, followed by scientists at one 
of the Helmholtz or Leibniz Association research centres (31 percent), at the Max Planck 
Society (8 percent) and at the Fraunhofer Society (7 percent). Finally, most scientists are in 
chemistry, physics, mathematics and computer sciences, followed by the life sciences, social 
sciences and humanities, and engineering sciences. 
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 3 presents the results from the multivariate probit models on the choice for the four 
different means of financing.  
                                                 
7  The means for the variables on the institutional affiliation of the scientist do not add up to 1 because 
scientists may be affiliated with both a university and a PRO. This overlap, however, is relatively small (60 
scientists in the sample) which is why the variable for university is excluded from the regressions as a base 
category. 
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Table 3: Multivariate probit model 
 Research grant received from 
 FP6 government foundations industry 
No. of publications 0.000 0.003* 0.011*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
No. of patent applications -0.002 0.073*** 0.043* 0.115*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) 
Gender (d, 1 = female) -0.011 -0.123 0.078 -0.224 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.119) (0.142) 
Age (years) -0.046 0.138** 0.108* 0.047 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.057) (0.061) 
Age (years)2 0.000 -0.001** -0.001* 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenured (d) 0.011 0.129 0.003 0.069 
 (0.140) (0.138) (0.137) (0.153) 
Research group leader (d) 0.378*** 0.630*** 0.412*** 0.559*** 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.103) (0.127) 
Grant received from FP1-5 (d) 1.034*** 0.304*** 0.016 0.092 
 (0.095) (0.090) (0.092) (0.097) 
Fraunhofer Society (d) 0.114 0.321 -0.737*** 0.266 
 (0.212) (0.196) (0.198) (0.206) 
Max Planck Society (d) -0.07 -0.514*** -0.317* -0.551*** 
 (0.163) (0.182) (0.162) (0.209) 
Helmholtz / Leibniz Association (d) 0.229** -0.025 -0.624*** -0.360*** 
 (0.109) (0.104) (0.102) (0.113) 
Life sciences (d) 0.303** 0.131 0.006 0.016 
 (0.131) (0.134) (0.128) (0.142) 
Chemistry, physics, mathematics (d) 0.531*** 0.058 -0.032 -0.133 
 (0.131) (0.133) (0.130) (0.151) 
Engineering sciences (d) 1.071*** 0.247* -0.363** 0.903*** 
 (0.153) (0.150) (0.141) (0.155) 
Constant 0.676 -4.387*** -2.960** -2.556* 
 (1.410) (1.502) (1.383) (1.498) 
rho (FP6 and (2), (3), (4))  0.062 0.009 -0.012 
rho (government and (3), (4))   0.257*** 0.440*** 
rho (foundations and (4))    0.279*** 
N 1004    
LR Chi2 738.732    
P-value 0.000    
(d): dummy variable; standard errors in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Reference categories: university affiliation; social sciences and humanities 
 
Regarding the scientist’s past productivity measured in terms of publications and patent 
applications the estimation results show that funding from all sources except for the FP6 is 
positively influenced by higher research productivity. Interestingly, productivity does not 
matter for funding through FP6 which is in stark contrast to the initial assumption that the 
scientists attracted to FP6 are among the most credentialed. Apparently, highly productive 
scientists prefer other funding sources. Regarding funding from the government, it turns out 
that more patents applied for by the scientist increase the likelihood of obtaining funding from 
this source while funding from foundations seems to be predominantly based on publications. 
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Moreover, scientists who are able to attract industry funding succeed primarily if they show 
both a high number of publications as well as patent applications. With respect to industry 
funding, this finding is somewhat in contrast to prior research on star scientist’s involvement 
in biotechnological research (Zucker and Darby, 1996; Zucker et al., 2002), where 
particularly high publication activities qualify scientists as attractive research partners.  
Regarding the control variables it turns out that there is no gender effect in the grant 
decision. Moreover, there is an inversely U-shaped effect from age for funding from 
government as well as foundations. No significant age effects can be detected for funding 
from FP6 and industry. As existing literature has suggested, research productivity should 
increase initially with increasing age up to a certain age from which scientists become less 
productive. Apparently, this seems to hold also for certain types of grants. No effect can be 
observed from being tenured or not. Instead, strong positive effects can be found from being a 
research group leader which is not surprising since these scientists have to support and 
finance a group of more junior researchers. Hence, their propensity to take advantage of the 
various types of grants should be higher. Having prior experience with one of the FPs only 
helps for receiving a grant in FP6 and from the government. While it is almost obvious that 
prior experience in an FP should help scientists in FP6, it is interesting to note that this also 
holds true for a government grant. There is no effect from experience on receiving a grant 
from foundations or industry, indicating a different orientation of the scientists. 
Coming to the institutional affiliation of the scientist, some selective effects can be 
identified. Scientists at the Fraunhofer Society exhibit a significantly lower propensity to be 
funded by foundations compared to university scientists which is the reference category. As 
Fraunhofer scientists typically work strongly application-oriented this negative effect does not 
come with surprise. However, a positive effect could have been expected for industry funding 
as all Fraunhofer institutes maintain close contacts with industry. Apparently, although the 
respective coefficient is positive, it is not significant. In contrast to this, scientists from any of 
the Max Planck Society’s institutes clearly have no need to acquire external grants. This is 
substantiated by the negative and significant coefficient for all grants but FP6 where the 
coefficient is insignificant. Finally, scientists at institutes of the Helmholtz or Leibniz 
Association are the only group that is significantly interested in FP6 funding. On the contrary, 
these scientists are much less likely to receive a grant from foundations or industry. 
With respect to the scientist’s discipline, being in life sciences, 
chemistry/physics/mathematics, and engineering sciences propels the chances to receive 
funding from FP6 in comparison to social sciences and humanities. This finding substantiates 
that FP6 held few opportunities for scientists in these disciplines. Engineering scientists also 
have higher chances to receive funding from government and industry. There is however a 
negative effect of engineering sciences on the probability of receiving a grant from 
foundations. Social sciences and humanities as the reference category thus seem to be more 
prominently present in these grant programmes. 
Finally, the multivariate probit model allows testing for correlation of the error terms rho 
between the four equations. It turns out that there is no significant correlation for the FP6 
equation’s error term with any other grant equation. Instead, all other error terms are 
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significantly positively correlated with each other. This finding suggests that scientists will 
typically consider applying either for an FP6 grant or any of the other grants. In other words, 
FP6 is not complementary to any of the other grant programmes but instead substitutive. 
Table 4 reports the results for the tobit models for the share of the scientist’s budget 
stemming from one of the four grants. Most of the results found in the multivariate probit 
model can be confirmed. Most interestingly, the scientist’s productivity in terms of 
publications and patents is negatively associated with the budget share from FP6 participation. 
This result goes even beyond the finding from the probit model and shows that FP6 
apparently attracted scientists with lower research productivity. Those with higher 
productivity aim at funding a larger share of their budget through foundations or industry. All 
other significant effects from the probit model for the productivity variables as well as for the 
scientist’s age and position have disappeared in the tobit. Regarding the prior experience with 
an FP, there is – as expected – a positive and significant effect for the budget share coming 
from FP6. The effect is even negative for foundations.  
The variables for the scientist’s affiliation make clear that Fraunhofer scientists raise a 
higher share of their budget from government grants or industry and a lower share from 
foundations. This finding confirms the effects of these scientists’ application-oriented 
research activities and qualifies the insignificant result from the multivariate probit model. 
Max Planck scientists have fewer incentives to acquire research grants as evidenced by the 
insignificant or negative coefficients. FP6 seems to be a predominant source of funding for 
scientists from the Helmholtz or Leibniz institutes. They also finance their activities to a 
larger extent through government grants but significantly less through foundations. Regarding 
the scientific disciplines, it turns out that scientists from all disciplines except the social 
sciences and humanities use FP6 grants to finance their budget, confirming the results from 
the multivariate probit model. Moreover, as expected, engineers raise a lower share from 
foundations but are significantly more engaged with industry. 
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Table 4: Tobit models 
 Share of research budget that stems from 
 FP6 government foundations industry 
No. of publications -0.001** 0.001 0.002** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of patent applications -0.014* 0.012 -0.007 0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Gender (d, 1 = female) -0.010 -0.018 0.049 -0.071 
 (0.050) (0.054) (0.056) (0.052) 
Age (years) -0.027 0.022 0.003 0.006 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.024) 
Age (years)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenured (d) -0.032 0.050 0.001 0.027 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.066) (0.059) 
Research group leader (d) -0.025 0.060 -0.047 0.068 
 (0.045) (0.051) (0.053) (0.047) 
Grant received from FP1-5 (d) 0.311*** 0.044 -0.148*** -0.032 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.035) 
Fraunhofer Society (d) -0.092 0.211*** -0.448*** 0.306*** 
 (0.077) (0.080) (0.100) (0.067) 
Max Planck Society (d) -0.032 -0.119 0.034 -0.134* 
 (0.071) (0.081) (0.078) (0.078) 
Helmholtz / Leibniz Association (d) 0.161*** 0.120*** -0.301*** -0.055 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.049) (0.042) 
Life sciences (d) 0.139** 0.101* -0.048 0.011 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.052) 
Chemistry, physics, mathematics (d) 0.199*** 0.074 0.008 -0.049 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.060) (0.055) 
Engineering sciences (d) 0.311*** 0.092 -0.337*** 0.303*** 
 (0.060) (0.064) (0.068) (0.056) 
Constant 0.619 -0.667 0.377 -0.454 
 (0.599) (0.676) (0.717) (0.593) 
R2 0.160 0.041 0.128 0.201 
N 755 726 726 726 
Wald Chi2 181.597 41.977 163.66 174.392 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(d): dummy variable; standard errors in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Reference categories: university affiliation; social sciences and humanities 
 
As outlined above, robustness checks of the results are performed using information on 
whether scientists perceive a high pressure for acquiring extramural research grants for 
continuing their research activities. It turns out that this holds true for 67 percent of the 
scientists. Table 6 and Table 7 in the appendix therefore show the robustness checks for the 
reduced sample of scientists. The results confirm the findings of the main models in that the 
productivity variables show similar effects. 
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6 Conclusion 
While the finding from previous studies that FP6 projects involved leading scientists 
remains certainly undisputed, evidence reported here suggests important qualifications to this 
statement. FP6 apparently did not succeed in becoming a premier source of funding as more 
productive scientists prefer grants from foundations or industry. Another important finding 
from this research is that scientists who chose FP6 are typically not the same who succeeded 
in attracting grants from other sources. In contrast to this, there is a positive correlation 
between government, foundation and industry grants. This suggests significant differences in 
the award criteria of the funding schemes and in the type of research that is funded by the 
different sources. FP6 obviously provided funding to very different scientists who rarely make 
use of other funding instruments. 
This research has demonstrated that the FP is in fact attractive and valuable to a certain 
group of scientists, i.e. those scientists whose work is application or consulting oriented. 
These scientists typically do not work at a university but at a PRO which depends to a large 
extent on third-party funding, e.g. an institute of the Helmholtz or Leibniz Associations. The 
reward criteria of scientists in these institutes are not exclusively based on academic merit but 
also consider the successful acquisition of extramural research grants. For this group of 
scientists, having experience with the FP generates a huge pay-off. They have developed a 
cumulative advantage on how to draft applications and how to structure consortia that have a 
high chance of obtaining funding.  
The policy lesson from this research is not unambiguous. On the one hand, the European 
Commission has left no doubt that the FPs are intended to complement national research 
funding by a supra-national instrument that seeks to facilitate collaboration among excellent 
scientists across Europe in order to create an integrated European Research Area supporting 
innovation, economic growth and prosperity. If we accept this policy rationale then there is a 
considerable need for adjusting the FP towards higher compatibility with the existing grant 
infrastructure of the EU member states. This adjustment should primarily involve changes to 
the types of grants awarded which aim at making the FP attractive for more productive 
scientists. Most funding instruments within the FP have frequently been criticised as being too 
inflexible and too much pre-determined with respect to a number of features, including for 
example the size and the structure of the consortia, the thematic orientation, the application 
procedure, or the requirements for project management (e.g., Rietschel, 2009). 
On the other hand, this research has demonstrated that there seems to be a functional 
“division of labour” between the FP and the other funding schemes. The FP finances research 
that is rather close to application which is typically not the field where scientists gain 
academic merit. However, scientists who conduct this type of research activities require 
funding too. As a consequence, there seems to be little need for changes to the programme 
itself but instead to the communication about and assessment of the FP. Such change is both 
timely and pivotal given that the recent budget increase from FP6 to FP7 by around 40 
percent also raises a higher need for accountability. With the start of FP7 in 2008, it is also the 
increased complexity of the FPs that poses challenges. The management of FP7 involves new 
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agencies – for example the European Research Council (ERC) –, new grant agreements and 
new operating practices. At the same time, the efficiency of the European STI system in 
general will become under scrutiny to achieve the goals set out by the EU 2020 strategy. The 
mid-term review of FP7 which is planned for 2010 may in this respect serve as one element in 
this process.  
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Appendix 
Table 5: Correlation table 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
No. of publications  1.00  
No. of patent applications  0.15 1.00  
Gender (d, 1 = female) -0.11 -0.07 1.00  
Age (years) 0.09 0.04 -0.12 1.00  
Tenured (d) 0.11 0.06 -0.18 0.43 1.00  
Research group leader (d) 0.27 0.10 -0.08 0.12 0.22 1.00  
Grant received from FP1-5 (d) 0.07 0.08 -0.05 0.10 0.14 0.02 1.00  
Fraunhofer Society (d) -0.15 0.20 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 0.08 1.00  
Max Planck Society (d) 0.09 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.24 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 1.00  
Helmholtz / Leibniz Association (d) -0.11 0.00 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.25 0.16 -0.18 -0.20 1.00  
Life sciences (d) 0.19 0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.10 -0.06 -0.12 0.07 0.01 1.00  
Chemistry, physics, mathematics (d) 0.13 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.06 0.09 0.15 -0.43 1.00  
Engineering sciences (d) -0.15 0.20 -0.13 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.18 0.31 -0.15 -0.03 -0.33 -0.34 1.00 
(d): dummy variable  
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Table 6: Multivariate probit model (robustness check) 
 Research grant received from 
 FP6 government foundations industry 
No. of publications -0.002 0.002 0.015*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
No. of patent applications -0.046 0.064** 0.029 0.137*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.038) 
Gender (d, 1 = female) -0.024 -0.236* 0.096 -0.307* 
 (0.154) (0.143) (0.149) (0.163) 
Age (years) -0.115 0.124* 0.057 -0.008 
 (0.080) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) 
Age (years)2 0.001 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenured (d) -0.052 0.252 -0.029 0.164 
 (0.173) (0.162) (0.169) (0.180) 
Research group leader (d) 0.387*** 0.556*** 0.095 0.291* 
 (0.149) (0.139) (0.136) (0.159) 
Grant received from FP1-5 (d) 1.028*** 0.193* -0.227** -0.028 
 (0.117) (0.106) (0.114) (0.111) 
Fraunhofer Society (d) 0.049 0.851*** -0.654*** 0.836*** 
 (0.259) (0.251) (0.226) (0.262) 
Max Planck Society (d) -0.208 -0.328 -0.092 -0.434* 
 (0.216) (0.230) (0.247) (0.259) 
Helmholtz / Leibniz Association (d) 0.302** 0.156 -0.672*** -0.282** 
 (0.141) (0.126) (0.129) (0.135) 
Life sciences (d) 0.174 -0.137 0.050 -0.032 
 (0.160) (0.162) (0.178) (0.172) 
Chemistry, physics, mathematics (d) 0.362** -0.243 -0.024 -0.221 
 (0.168) (0.167) (0.182) (0.185) 
Engineering sciences (d) 1.023*** 0.016 -0.491*** 0.950*** 
 (0.192) (0.180) (0.187) (0.193) 
Constant 2.528 -3.612** -1.288 -0.930 
 (1.950) (1.805) (1.807) (1.779) 
rho (FP6 and (2), (3), (4))  -0.134** -0.146** -0.080 
rho (government and (3), (4))   -0.131* 0.268*** 
rho (foundations and (4))    -0.018 
N 675    
LR Chi2 469.515    
P-value 0.000    
(d): dummy variable; standard errors in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Reference categories: university affiliation; social sciences and humanities 
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Table 7: Tobit models (robustness checks) 
 Share of research budget that stems from 
 FP6 government foundations industry 
No. of publications -0.002** 0.000 0.002** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of patent applications -0.016* 0.011 -0.003 0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Gender (d, 1 = female) -0.025 -0.022 0.036 -0.078 
 (0.048) (0.052) (0.054) (0.049) 
Age (years) -0.034 0.028 0.021 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.023) 
Age (years)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenured (d) -0.009 0.055 -0.012 0.035 
 (0.056) (0.062) (0.064) (0.056) 
Research group leader (d) -0.035 0.088* -0.092* 0.002 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.055) (0.046) 
Grant received from FP1-5 (d) 0.268*** 0.033 -0.152*** -0.031 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.040) (0.033) 
Fraunhofer Society (d) -0.104 0.223*** -0.449*** 0.249*** 
 (0.074) (0.077) (0.096) (0.063) 
Max Planck Society (d) -0.048 -0.049 -0.013 -0.089 
 (0.075) (0.084) (0.081) (0.078) 
Helmholtz / Leibniz Association (d) 0.133*** 0.100** -0.299*** -0.058 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.048) (0.041) 
Life sciences (d) 0.105* -0.012 0.017 0.034 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.060) (0.053) 
Chemistry, physics, mathematics (d) 0.163*** -0.027 0.046 -0.011 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.063) (0.056) 
Engineering sciences (d) 0.285*** -0.004 -0.284*** 0.296*** 
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.069) (0.057) 
Constant 0.394*** 0.415*** 0.445*** 0.334*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
R2 0.159 0.034 0.149 0.224 
N 651 628 628 628 
Wald Chi2 147.29 28.716 155.267 158.336 
P-value 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 
(d): dummy variable; standard errors in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Reference categories: university affiliation; social sciences and humanities 
 
